Polish Democracy under Threat? An Issue of Mere Politics or a Real Danger? by Jankovic, Sava
                                                              
University of Dundee
Polish Democracy under Threat? An Issue of Mere Politics or a Real Danger?
Jankovic, Sava
Published in:






Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Jankovic, S. (2016). Polish Democracy under Threat? An Issue of Mere Politics or a Real Danger? Baltic Journal
of Law and Politics, 9(1), 49-68. DOI: 10.1515/bjlp-2016-0003
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 17. Feb. 2017
  
 
BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS 
A Journal of Vytautas Magnus University 









POLISH DEMOCRACY UNDER THREAT? 





University of Dundee, School of Law (United Kingdom) 
Contact information 
Address: Nethergate, Dundee DD1 4HN, United Kingdom 
Phone: +447508001008 
E-mail address: sjankovic@dundee.ac.uk 
 
 
Received: February 19, 2016; reviews: 2; accepted: May 17, 2016. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Poland has recently experienced a constitutional crisis. The crisis involves the role of 
the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in the election of judges and amendments to the 
Constitutional Tribunal Act which threatens the independence of the Tribunal. The situation is 
exacerbated by changes in the media, civil service, police, and prosecution laws introduced 
by the ruling party. This article analyses the changes, as well as the domestic and 
international reactions to the crisis, and considers whether the heavy criticism of the PiS is 
justified, or whether it results from, for instance, specific characteristics of the Polish political 
system and an unfavourable opinion in Europe about the Law and Justice party. 
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The last few months have been lively for internal politics within Poland and 
the image of Poland in Europe. Since the victory in the September parliamentary 
elections, the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), with the support 
of its former member, and the current President of Poland, have revamped the 
organizational structure of the country in line with their political manifesto. The 
party has not only kept its campaign promises and filled the highest positions with 
its own political dignitaries, but also, according to many domestic and foreign 
analysts, encroached upon the fundamental values of the modern European State: 
by undermining democracy, the rule of law and the principle of sound governance. 
Their approach raises questions as to whether movements directed towards the 
subordination of the Constitutional Tribunal, abrupt changes in media, civil service, 
prosecution, and police laws are genuinely a matter of concern or simply a 
reflection of the unfavourable opinion that the conservative Law and Justice Party 
enjoys in Europe? 
1. CRITICISM OF THE LAW AND JUSTICE PARTY – PIS: INTERNAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS 
A vociferous domestic response has been provoked about the situation in 
Poland in relation to the amending of existing laws in an accelerated legislative 
procedure and the so called ‘Constitutional Tribunal crisis’. Numerous public bodies, 
NGOs and representatives of academia have expressed their contempt for the 
actions of the current government. Prominent amongst them are the comments of 
Jan Zimmermann, a professor of administrative law and (former) supervisor of the 
doctoral thesis of the current President of Poland, Andrzej Duda. Zimmermann 
criticized his former student for breaching the Constitution1 and together with the 
Law Faculty Board of the Jagiellonian University has called on the President to take 
“immediate actions to prevent the permanent imbalance between the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers”. 2  In November 2015, The Committee for the 
                                           
1 Whenever a discussion about democracy or the rule of law concept arises in Poland, the primary source 
of reference is the 1997 Constitution, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] 1997 No. 78 Item 483, as amended. 
Poland effectively has a written constitution with democratic values, legalism and the rule of law 
contained in one single act, in contrast to the UK, where the concept of constitutionalism is based on 
multiple sources of law (see Lech Garlicki, Polskie prawo konstytucyjne (Warsaw: Liber, 2006), 53-80; 
Pawel Sarnecki, Prawo Konstytucyjne RP (Cracow: CH Beck, 2013), 69-86; Jaroslaw Sozański, “Zasada 
demokratycznego państwa prawnego w polskiej praktyce prawnej,” KNUV 4 (2014)). 
2 Resolution 303/XI/2015 of the Law Faculty Board of the Jagiellonian University of 30 November 2015. 
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 12/1/16 12:02 PM
BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS  ISSN 2029-0454 
VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1  2016 
 
 51 
Defence of Democracy was established, which organized several protests around 
Poland.3 
The revelations quickly reverberated throughout Europe and attracted the 
attention of most of the international organizations responsible for democracy and 
the rule of law. On January 13 the EU Commission decided to launch an 
unprecedented procedure to monitor the threats to the rule of law in Poland. 4 
Pursuant to the 2014 EU Rule of Law Framework, it starts with a dialogue between 
the Commission and the concerned Member State, after which, if a State does not 
implement the recommendations made by the Commission a procedure set out in 
Art 7 TEU can be initiated.5 The trigger for the process envisaged in Art 7 may lead 
to suspension of treaty rights in relation to the Member State in question (including 
voting rights). It is unlikely, however, that this would happen due to the 
complicated voting procedure, which demands unanimity in the Council. 6  The 
procedure is viewed as more of a political censure than a real judicial instrument 
since, for example, it does not provide for the exclusion of the State from the 
Union, even if it undermines the values upon which the Union is founded. 7 On 
January 19th the European Parliament organized the “debate about Poland”, during 
which the Polish Prime Minister, Beata Szydło, was questioned by members of the 
EU Parliament with regard to the issues raised in respect of the rule of law. The 
leaders of the various political groups decided to defer any decision to issue a 
(unbinding) resolution until the results of the communication between the Polish 
government and the EU Commission and the opinion of the Venice Commission 
relating to the same issues.8 It is highly probable that the EU Parliament will return 
to this matter, as the latter institution (The Venice Commission) on March 11 
published a very unfavourable opinion about Poland.9 
                                           
3 More about the activities of the Committee at: http://komitetobronydemokracji.pl. 
4  European Commission press release (January 13, 2016) // http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-62_en.htm. See also “The EU and the Rule of Law – What next?” EU Justice 
Commissioner Viviane Reding’s speech, Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels (September 4, 
2013); “How to Protect European Values – Assessing European Responses to Recent Reforms in Poland,” 
Webcast of the Max Plank Society and Verfassungsblog (March 14, 2016) // 
https://www.mpg.de/10330824/max-planck-forum-berlin-protecting-european-values-poland. 
5 “A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law,” Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council (March 19, 2014), COM(2014) 158 final/2. 
6 Hungary in line with couple of other Member States is very likely to oppose such action. 
7 Jan Werner Müller, “Safeguarding democracy inside the EU: Brussels and the future of liberal order,” 
Transatlantic Academy Paper Series 3 (2013): 17-18, 29; Philip Weyand, “Politik, Recht und die Rule of 
Law irgendwo dazwischen: zur Rechtsstaatlichkeits¬debatte zwischen EU und Polen,” Verfassungsblog 
(January 21, 2016) // http://verfassungsblog.de/politik-recht-und-die-rule-of-law-irgendwo-dazwischen-
zur-rechtsstaatlichkeitsdebatte-zwischen-eu-und-polen/. 
8 The Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law) founded in 1990 is an 
advisory body of the Council of Europe. Its opinions are deemed as most respectful in terms of rule of 
law and democracy issues. The Polish Prime Minister refused to answer whether Poland will follow its 
recommendations. 
9 Venice Commission Opinion CDL-AD (2016)001 on the Amendments of the Act of 25 June 2015 on the 
Constitutional Tribunal of Poland adopted at 106th Plenary Session, Venice (March 11-12, 2016). 
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The Polish actions have also been criticised by nearly all of the European and 
international media, in particular in Germany. 10  The President of the European 
Parliament, Martin Schulz, in an interview given to the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, stated that “Polish democracy is carried out in the style of Russian leader 
Vladimir Putin and the entire democratic spectrum from left to right believes that 
such politics [conducted by PiS] are contrary to fundamental European values”.11 
2. THE SUBJECT OF CRITICISM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL 
PROBLEM AND CHANGES IN MEDIA, CIVIL SERVICE, THE POLICE, AND 
PROSECUTION LAW 
2.1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL CRISIS 
The main criticisms directed against PiS include the non-acceptance of the 
election of five judges on 8th October by the previous Sejm (dominated by the 
political party, Civic Platform) and amendments introduced to the Constitutional 
Tribunal Act.12 The process of becoming a judge, in theory, ends with the election 
in the Sejm but in practice ends only after being sworn in by the President.13 The 
Law and Justice Party and the President argued that the election of two of the five 
judges was flawed, as their nomination should have been done by the new 
parliament because the term of office of the judges they were to replace ended 
during that time. On that basis, the President refused to take the oath from all the 
judges. On 19th November, the newly composed Parliament amended the Law in 
respect of the Constitutional Tribunal, which inter alia enabled the dismissal of the 
previously appointed judges. On November 25 the Parliament annulled the election 
of all five judges14 and a week later, on December 2, resolved to appoint five new 
judges15, from whom the President took the oath immediately. Such actions raised 
serious constitutional concerns and a group of Sejm Deputies, the National Council 
of the Judiciary, the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights and the First President of the 
                                           
10 Timothy Garton Ash, “The pillars of Poland’s democracy are being destroyed,” The Guardian (January 
17, 2016); Joanna Berendt, “Poland’s President Approves Controls on State Media, Alarming E.U. 
Leaders,” The New Your Times (January 7, 2016); “Pologne: manifestations ‘pour la démocratie’," Le 
Figaro (December 19, 2015); Reinhard Veser, “Polens Demokratie ist in Gefahr,” Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (December 17, 2015); Florian Hassel, “Polen: Kaczyński tritt die Demokratie mit Füßen,” 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (November 27, 2015). 
11  Martin Schulz, “Das ist gelenkte Demokratie nach Putins Art,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(January 9, 2016). 
12 Constitutional Tribunal Act, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.], 1997 No. 102, item 643, as amended. 
13 Article 5.5 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act stipulates that a person elected to the office of a judge 
shall take the oath from the President of the Republic of Poland. The refusal to take the oath shall be 
equivalent to a resignation from the office of a judge of the Tribunal (Art 5.6). 
14 Resolutions of the Sejm of 25 November 2015, Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland, Monitor 
Polski, pos.: 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 1135. 
15 Resolutions of the Sejm of 2 December 2015, Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland, Monitor 
Polski, pos.: 1182, 1183, 1184, 1185, 1186. 
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Supreme Court filed a motion to the Constitutional Tribunal. 16  The Tribunal 
delivered two judgements. In its first judgement K 34/15 of December 3, 2015, 
they ruled that the President has to take oath from elected judges immediately and 
the exclusive right to appoint judges rests with the Sejm.17 In effect, this confirmed 
that the appointment of judges, in practice, ends with their appointment by the 
Sejm and not with their taking of the oath. According to judge-rapporteur of the 
Constitutional Tribunal Marek Zubik, the instant appointment of the elected state 
officials is embedded in the European legal culture, ‘it is a certain established 
standard’. The UK equivalent to the constitutional conventions could serve as an 
example in so much as royal assent is given to Acts of Parliament without 
unnecessary procrastination and objection.18 Moreover, the suspicion of invalidity of 
the Act regulating the election of judges enjoys presumption of constitutionality 
until proven to the contrary by the Constitutional Tribunal. 
In a similar manner, the Tribunal addressed this issue in its second 
judgement K 35/15, where it declared as unconstitutional the amendment to the 
Constitutional Tribunal Act of 19th November 2015 (Art 21.1), which introduced a 
30 day period, during which the President should take the oath from elected 
judges. In the reasoning of the Tribunal it would contradict the former judgement, 
as the President is obliged to take the oath immediately. Moreover it would 
introduce the President’s role to co-participation in the creation of the Tribunal’s 
composition and denote a delay in tenure’s running. The Tribunal ruled as 
unconstitutional provisions regarding expiry of the tenure of the current president 
and vice-president of the Tribunal 3 months after the Act came into force (Art 2 of 
the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 19th November 2015). It also excluded the 
possibility of the re-election of the president of the Tribunal (Art 12 of the 
Constitutional Tribunal Act of 19th November 2015) on the grounds of ‘exceptional 
political pressure’.19 
                                           
16 Pursuant to Article 191 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland the following public bodies can 
make application to the Constitutional Tribunal: the President of the Republic, the Marshal of the Sejm, 
the Marshal of the Senate, the Prime Minister, 50 Deputies, 30 Senators, the First President of the 
Supreme Court, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Public Prosecutor-General, the 
President of the Supreme Chamber of Control and the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights, the National 
Council of the Judiciary, to the extent specified in Article 186, para. 2, the constitutive organs of units of 
local government, the national organs of trade unions as well as the national authorities of employers' 
organizations and occupational organizations, churches and religious organizations and the subjects 
referred to in Article 79 to the extent specified therein. 
17 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal K 34/15 of 3 December 2015, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.], 
No. 0, Item 2129. Although the operational ability, including remuneration, and probably immunity 
commences only after receiving Presidential oath, the nine year long tenure of the judge of the 
Constitutional Tribunal starts with the election in the Sejm; eventually after the expiry of the tenure of 
serving judge. 
18 The Royal Assent has not been refused since 1708, when Queen Anne refused it for a Bill for settling 
the militia in Scotland. See also: Royal Assent Act 1976. 
19 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal K 35/15 of 9 December 2015, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.], 
No. 0, Item 2147. 
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In both judgements the Tribunal confirmed that the election of two of the five 
judges (Professors Andrzej Sokala, and Bronisław Sitek) was flawed. This was 
because it was done by the VII Sejm, whose term ended on November 12, while 
the tenure of the elected judges was to commence on the 2nd and 8th of December 
respectively, the same day the nine-year tenure of the two former judges ended.  
The three other judges, whose tenure ended on the 6th of November (Professors 
Roman Hauser, Krzysztof Ślebzak and Andrzej Jakubecki) were elected properly, as 
the tenure of the Sejm overlapped with the date of the ending of the tenure of 
three former judges.20 In other words, only the Sejm in office during which term of 
office the tenure of the Constitutional Tribunal judge(s) expires is entitled to elect 
judge(s); it would act ultra vires electing judges, whose term ends during the term 
of office of the prospective Sejm. 
The belief held by the Law and Justice Party that the procedure for the 
appointment of the judges by the previous Sejm was flawed was seen as an 
obvious reason for not appointing them. As such, it triggered an accelerated 
procedure for the election and nomination of the five new judges as early as 
December 2, 2015, 21  although the Constitutional Tribunal, applying preventive 
measures, requested to abstain from electing new judges until its judgement K 
34/15, which was due on December 3.22 Whilst there was uncertainty regarding the 
election of two of the judges, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional by 
the Tribunal, it is inexplicable why the Sejm decided to elect five judges anew, 
rather than just the two, bearing in mind that, pursuant to Art 194.1 of the 
Constitution, judges are elected individually. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, 
neither the President nor any executive or legislative body is competent to question 
the election of judges, as this is solely within the domain of appropriate judicial 
body. Therefore, the annulment of the appointments of the elected judges on the 
25th of November by the new parliament is highly disputed, as the Parliament is 
only entitled to elect judges, and not to recall them.23 Art 36 of the Constitutional 
Act states that expiry of the mandate of a judge before the end of its tenure is 
possible only in four instances: death, resignation, conviction by a valid court 
judgement, and a legally valid disciplinary decision. 
                                           
20 The VII Sejm electing of two judges, whose tenure were to commence during the term of the VIII 
Sejm under Art 137 of the Constitutional Act was in breach of Art 194 of the Constitution. 
21 Four of five judges were elected and took oath from the President in the same day, the fifth judge, 
Julia Przyłębska, took oath from the President on 8 December, when the tenure of the judge, whom she 
replaced ended. 
22 On 30 November 2015, on the basis of Articles 755. 1 and 730. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code taken 
together with Article 74 of the Act, the Constitutional Tribunal decided to take preventive measures 
requesting the Sejm to abstain from electing new judges until the final verdict in case K 34/15 was 
delivered. 
23  Arkadiusz Radwan, “Chess-Boxing Around the Rule of Law – Polish Constitutionalism at Trial,” 
Allerhand Working Paper 13 (2016): 10. 
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2.1.1. THE PARALYSIS OF THE TRIBUNAL 
The effect of manipulating the law resulted in Poland having 15 Constitutional 
judges from December 2, and 18 from December 3, contrary to Art 194 of the 
Constitution which stipulates that the Tribunal is composed of 15 judges.24 The 
conflict is between the ruling party and the Tribunal itself. The ruling party, for 
which the case was closed on the 2nd of December 2015 with the election and oath 
taking from the five judges it appointed, has to deal with the Tribunal judgement of 
the 3rd of December, which confirmed the validity of the election of the three judges 
under the previous Sejm and obliged the President to take the oath from them. This 
situation presents a real Gordian knot, as on the one side the process of becoming 
a judge was formally and practically ended, while from the other the Constitutional 
Tribunal judgements are final.25 The President has not thus far acknowledged the 
three correctly elected judges and the President of the Constitutional Tribunal, 
acting under Art 45 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act has only admitted two judges 
to the adjudicating bench elected on December 2, leaving the Tribunal with 12 
adjudicating judges and six with an uncertain status. The conflict impedes the 
functioning of the Tribunal and, according to many, may serve the ruling party, 
which uses every occasion to further downgrade its role. On the 22nd of December, 
the Law and Justice Party amended, for the second time, the Constitutional Tribunal 
Act. It introduced the provisions that, for the Tribunal to render a decision initiated 
by an application, at least 13 of the Court’s 15 judges must be present26 and there 
must be a two-thirds majority vote (before a simple majority was enough and cases 
were decided by three, five or all judges depending on the matter).27 The second 
novelty is the obligation to exam cases in chronological order, i.e. starting with 
those that arrive first.28 In the current state of affairs, it becomes clear that such 
regulations only lead to suspension of the work of this important institution. The 
Tribunal, in its judgement of 9th March K 47/15 ruled these, together with some 
other provisions, unconstitutional.29 This was a precedent ruling. The Tribunal was 
not only a judge in its own case but also refused to apply the amended 
Constitutional Tribunal Act, to which it is obliged, under Article 197 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland, stipulating that “the organization of the 
                                           
24 For an interesting analysis and comparison with the 1929 Austrian Constitutional Court crisis consult: 
Anna Śledzińska-Simon, “Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal under Siege,” Verfassungsblog (December 4, 
2015) // http://verfassungsblog.de/author/anna-sledzinska/. 
25 Article 190 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. 
26 Individual complaints and preliminary requests will still only require the presence of seven judges. 
27 Act amending the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 22 December 2015, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.], No. 0, 
Item 2217, Art 1.3 
28 Ibid., Art 1.10 
29 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal K 47/15 of 9 December 2015 [the judgement has not been 
published yet]. 
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Constitutional Tribunal, as well as the mode of proceedings before it, shall be 
specified by statute”. 30  On one hand, the principle of presumption of 
constitutionality of Statues applies, whereas, on the other hand, it is evident that 
any Sejm could paralyse the Tribunal and that indeed these provisions were a 
subject of scrutiny. The Tribunal’s argument was based on the grounds that, a) 
there is no other organ entrusted with the task to determine constitutionality of 
Statutes, including the Constitutional Tribunal Act; 31  b) the assessment of 
conformity with the Constitution of an Act regulating the procedure before the 
Tribunal should take priority. The Tribunal cannot work (and adjudicate) based on 
provisions that raise serious doubts with regard to their conformity with the 
Constitution;32 c) in the formal and legal conditions, on the day of the issuance of 
the judgement, the full adjudicating bench amounts to twelve judges. According to 
the judgement K 34/15, which after its publication in the Journal of Laws has 
become a universally applicable law, three of five judges elected by the VII Sejm 
were elected properly, from whom the President has to receive oath (though has 
not yet done so). Therefore the president of the Tribunal has ‘legitimized’ only two 
of the five judges elected by VIII Sejm, reserving places for the three formerly 
properly elected. The ruling Law and Justice party declared the judgement as ‘a 
meeting over coffee’ and announced it will not publish it as it was reached with the 
breach of the law (twelve judges decided instead of thirteen and the simple 
majority instead of two-thirds were used).33 
In her almost ‘thirty years old democracy’, Poland has never been confronted 
with such an unprecedented situation in which the government refuses to publish 
the Constitutional Tribunal judgements (to which it is obliged under Art 190.2) and 
the president of the Tribunal is entangled in a political dispute. Non-publishing of 
the Constitutional Tribunal judgement will result in a perplexing legal situation, in 
which the judgment, if not published, strictly speaking, could not be regarded as 
universally applicable law, but the Tribunal is likely to obey its judgement in future 
resting on Art 190.1 of the Constitution, which provides that the judgements of the 
                                           
30 See also Decision of the Constitutional Tribunal P 12/98 of 22 March 2000, OTK ZU No 2/2000, pos. 
67. 
31 Cf. Art 188.1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. 
32 According to Article 190 of the Polish Constitution the “judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal shall 
be of universally binding application and shall be final”. Because, the Constitution does not provide any 
form of control or questioning of the Constitutional Tribunal judgements on the basis of procedural flaws, 
it is of utmost importance that every potential constitutional doubts regarding the basis of its 
adjudication are resolved before these provisions become applicable. The judges while taking the 
decision referred to Article 195 (1) of the Constitution that states “Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, 
in the exercise of their office, shall be independent and subject only to the Constitution”. 
33 The Tribunal invoked Art 190.5 of the Constitution as lex superior stipulating that “judgements shell 
be made by a majority of votes”. Similar objections were raised with regard to the decision of the 
Constitutional Tribunal U 8/15 of 7 January 2016 about the discontinuation of the proceedings in relation 
to the Sejm’s resolutions of the election of ten new judges. The decision was taken by 10 instead of 13 
judges. 
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Constituting Tribunal are final. The Venice Commission, in its recent opinion ‘On 
Amendments to the Act of 25th June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland’ 
urges Poland to respect the judgement (para 143) and provides two examples, 
where it dealt with non liquet in proceedings before a constitutional court. In the 
Romanian case in 2006 the Venice Commission opined that the lack of required 
quorum due to the recusals cannot lead to “inability of the Court to take a 
decision”34. It took a similar approach in the Albanian case, where, in its amicus 
curie opinion for the Constitutional Court of Albania stated that the Albanian 
Constitutional Court is competent to examine the law, which affects the judges of 
the same Court, providing that: “the authorization of the Court derives from the 
necessity to make sure that no law is exempt from constitutional review, including 
laws that relate to the position of judges”.35 The Commission concludes that “a 
refusal to publish judgment 47/15 of 9th March 2016 would not only be contrary to 
the rule of law, such an unprecedented move would further deepen the 
constitutional crisis triggered by the election of judges in autumn 2015 and the 
Amendments of 22nd December 2015”. In its opinion “crippling the Tribunal’s 
effectiveness will undermine all three basic principles of the Council of Europe: 
democracy – because of an absence of a central part of checks and balances; 
human rights – because the access of individuals to the Constitutional Tribunal 
could be slowed down to a level resulting in the denial of justice;36 and the rule of 
law – because the Constitutional Tribunal, which is a central part of the Judiciary in 
Poland, would become ineffective.”37 
2.1.2. FINDING A WAY OUT 
Bearing in mind the complexity of the situation, which is a relic of legal 
negligence of the previous epochs, it is difficult to say who has right in the present 
dispute, as legal arguments are on both sides. The gaps in Polish constitutional law 
are profound enough to cause a stalemate situation, which could be resolved only 
by political means. Three options seem viable to help to overcome the Polish 
constitutional crisis. First, to increase the number of judges of the Constitutional 
Tribunal to 18, which requires a change in the Constitution. Second, to accept all 
                                           
34 Venice Commission Opinion CDL-AD (2006)006 on the Two Draft Laws amending Law No. 47/1992 on 
the organisation and functioning of the Constitutional Court of Romania adopted at 66th plenary session, 
Venice (March 17-18, 2006), par. 7. 
35 Venice Commission Amicus Curiae Opinion CDL-AD (2009)044 on the Law on the cleanliness of the 
figure of high functionaries of the Public Administration and Elected Persons of Albania adopted at 80th 
Plenary Session, Venice (October 9-10, 2009), par. 142. 
36 See, e.g., Hornsby v. Greece, European Court of Human Rights, 1997, no. 18357/91, par. 40; Burdov 
v. Russia, European Court of Human Rights, 2002, no. 59498/00), par. 34ff; Gerasimov and Others v. 
Russia, European Court of Human Rights, 2014, no. 29920/05, par. 168. 
37 Venice Commission Opinion CDL-AD (2016)001, supra note 9, para. 138. 
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six judges, because in 2016/2017 the tenure of three of the current judges ends. If 
so, they should serve their term according to the date of election in the Sejm. 
Third, after the end of the tenure of the current president of the Tribunal (Prof. 
Anrzej Rzepliński) in December this year, the next president may express a more 
conformist attitude towards the newly elected judges and admit them to the 
adjudicating bench, ignoring those who have not been sworn in. The Venice 
Commission, following some domestic propositions, suggests that in order to 
‘depoliticize’ judges of the Constitutional Tribunal that are currently elected by the 
Sejm for a nine year tenure it is worth trying to spread the nomination authority 
across different bodies. So, a third of the judges would be appointed/elected by the 
President, another third by the Judiciary and the last third by the Parliament 
(Sejm), which it would elect the with qualified majority (2/3) as opposed to current 
simple majority.38 In the worst case scenario, if both parties fail to make an effort 
to negotiate in good faith, the impasse may continue, resulting in the Tribunal 
proceeding in line with is ruling K 47/15 and the government not publishing the 
decisions. This situation would be very dangerous, as the Constitution would be in a 
tenuous position, which might lead to its abuse and trigger the European 
Commission action as described above. 
2.2. MEDIA, CIVIL SERVICE, THE POLICE, AND PROSECUTION LAWS 
Although the Constitutional Court problem seems to have attracted the most 
international and domestic attention, the Law and Justice Party has also faced 
serious criticism due to new laws relating to the media, civil service, the police, and 
prosecution. The new Police Act restricts civil freedoms through monitoring of the 
Internet. According to the new law, the police and other services 39  can obtain 
information from internet providers without a court order or any obligation to 
inform the party concerned. The most troubling issue pertains to Art 20c of the 
Police Act, which is particularly vague, in relation to the collection of “internet 
data”, which could include the content of sent messages including e-mails.40 The 
civil service law is said to favour those loyal to the party. This is demonstrated by 
the Act allowing for the termination of contracts of all high-ranked state officials 30 
days after it comes into force, provided that no offer of extension will be 
                                           
38 Ibid., para 141. 
39 Treasury Intelligence, Gendarmerie, Border Police, Customs Service, Internal Security Agency, Central 
Anticorruption Bureau, Military Counterintelligence Service are among entitled institutions. 
40  See more about this problem in Joint letter of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights of 30 
December 2015, the Panoptykon Foundation of 27 December 2015 and the Polish Bar Council of 29 
December 2015 to the Marshal of the Sejm // 
http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/HFHR_venice_comission_2122015.pdf. 
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available.41 Until now the work agreement could be terminated by a refusal to take 
the oath, loss of citizenship, a legally effective ruling on loss of civil rights or the 
prohibition of exercising the state function in the civil service. 42  Moreover, the 
employment relationship is no longer stable since it can be terminated at any time. 
In addition the positions have become politicised. The higher positions are not 
chosen through fair competition but are nominated, most of them by the Prime 
Minister. The current Civil Service Council, of which 8 of 15 members were elected 
by the Prime Minister, was replaced by the Social Service Council, with all members 
being selected by the Prime Minister. In relation to the law regarding prosecution, 
the main concern is the linking of functions between the Prosecutor General and the 
Minister of Justice. According to the opposition party, Civic Platform, it is the last 
step in taking control of the state.43 The new function is a clear politicization of the 
Prosecutor’s office and provides significant opportunities to control the work of the 
whole prosecution service by, for example, issuing decrees, guidelines and 
recommendations. Moreover, the Prosecutor General gained wide ranging authority 
for administering personnel policy in the prosecution, i.e. appointing and dismissing 
directors of prosecution departments without the need for any competition for the 
posts. Also of concern are provisions empowering the Prosecutor General to hand 
over to the media information about ongoing preparatory proceedings.44 In light of 
ECtHR judgements relating to informing the public about ongoing investigations it 
has stated that it “requires to be done with consideration and reticence necessary 
for the respect for the principle of presumption of innocence”.45 Finally, the Law 
and Justice Party has introduced changes to the law in respect of the media, which 
appear to serve the ruling party. In the new Media Act senior figures in public radio 
and television will no longer be hired through a selection process organised by the 
National Broadcasting Council. They will be appointed—and can be fired—by the 
treasury minister. 46  In this instance the tenures of the former board members 
legally end after the appointment of new ones.47 The Polish Media, in the opinion of 
many institutions, despite being responsible for independence and pluralism of 
media, is no longer public and has begun to be an instrument of government.48 
                                           
41 Act amending the Civil Service Act and other Acts of 30 December 2015, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.], 
No. 0, Item 34, Art 6.1. 
42 Civil Service Act, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.], 2008 No. 227, Item 1505, as amended, Art 70.  
43 During the voting in the Sejm on 28 January 2016 all political parties, except for PiS, voted against 
the proposed changes (209 against, 7 abstained 236 for). 
See: http://www.euractiv.pl/demokracja/artykul/projekt-ustawy-o-prokuraturze-przyjty-007924. 
44 Bill amending the Prosecution Act, The Sejm Print, no 162, Art 12. 
45 Mirosław Garlicki v. Poland, European Court of Human Rights, 2011, no. 36921/07. 
46 Act amending the National Broadcasting Act of 30 December 2015, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.], No. 0, 
Item 25, Art 1.2. 
47 Ibid., Art 3.2. 
48 See, e.g., statement of Dunja Mijatović, the OSCE media freedom representative who “urged Poland’s 
government to withdraw proposed changes to the selection of management in public service 
broadcasters” of 30 December 2015; the joint statement from European Federation of Journalists, the 
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3. THE RULE OF THE LAW AND JUSTICE PARTY: IS THE CRITICISM 
JUSTIFIED? 
Considering the issues discussed above, it may be concluded that the Law and 
Justice party operates outside the limits of the law and endangers the fundamental 
principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. However, are the 
domestic and international criticisms, clothed in legal arguments, really justified? 
Providing an answer is difficult for at least two reasons. First, the Law and Justice 
party has not thus far blatantly breached the law. In truth, it has worked on the 
verge of law, adjusting it for its own purposes but still within the limit enabled/set 
by the nature of the Polish political system. Second, the Law and Justice party is a 
conservative party, which firmly solves internal issues and employs Eurosceptic 
policies when it comes to integration issues. That may facilitate the conflation 
between who rules and how he rules, which normally should be separated, by being 
particular about the party’s rule. 49  Political stigmatization may, in certain 
circumstances, also lead to calumniation by reference to legal instruments being at 
the disposal of antagonistic political forces. 
To elucidate on the first argument, it is necessary to give recourse to the 
characteristics of the Polish political system, which gives more power to those who 
gain the most public support. Hence, not all criticism espoused against the ruling 
party (PiS) can be objectively justified, especially when its opponents complain 
about the scope of power. In this instance, the Polish political system is at fault and 
not the party that governs. On May 25, 2015, Andrzej Duda, the PiS candidate, won 
the presidential elections and on October 25, 2015, the Law and Justice party (PiS) 
won the parliamentary election without the need to form a coalition (235 of 460 
seats in the Sejm and 61 of 100 in the Senate); this happens particularly rarely.50 
As such, the Law and Justice Party was able to form its own government, has a 
majority in both chambers of parliament and the support of the President. In reality 
this means there is no mechanism for achieving a balance of power. The legislative 
process, which in such conditions may operate instantly and without any hindrance, 
illustrates this. A bill introduced in the Sejm goes to the Senate, which according to 
Art 121 of the Constitution may approve it without amendments, adopt 
amendments or reject a proposed Bill within 30 days. The absolute majority in the 
                                                                                                                           
European Broadcasting Union, the Association of European Journalists and Reporters Without Borders, 
which charged that the effect of the new broadcasting law is to abolish existing safeguards for pluralism 
and independence of public service media governance in Poland of 30 December 2015. 
49  Cf. Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, “The Polish Constitutional Crisis and ‘Politics of Paranoia’,” 
Verfassungsblog (March 11, 2016). 
50 This is an unprecedented situation in the after 1989 Poland. Poland had minority governments in 
2004-2005, 2005-2006, and in 2007; however, such governments proved to be very inefficient. The 
current Sejm (VIII) has commenced its term on 12 November 2015, when President Andrzej Duda 
convened its first session and when the elected members of Parliament were sworn in. 
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Sejm might nevertheless overcome a negative vote by the Senate but it is 
problematic and time-consuming. In order for such a bill to become law it needs the 
President’s signature, who, pursuant to Art 122 of the Constitution, has 21 days 
either to sign the bill, refer it to the Constitutional Tribunal for adjudication as to 
whether it conforms with the Constitution, or veto it. The last two options may be 
fatal to a bill. If it is judged by the Constitutional Tribunal not to be in conformity 
with the Constitution, such a bill cannot become law, whereas the Presidential veto 
might, in principle, still be overpowered, but this demands the 3/5 majority in the 
Sejm.51 The ability of the PiS to rule seems, therefore, quite privileged. In reality, 
they are only unable to change the Constitution, which requires a 2/3 majority, in 
the Sejm. They are subject to the subsequent control of statutes by the 
Constitutional Tribunal (3/5 majority in the Sejm to bypass the Presidential veto 
and the a priori constitutional control of a Bill by the President does not apply 
considering the President’s allegiance to PiS).52 The importance of changing the 
Constitution becomes irrelevant in circumstances when a party is able to 
subordinate the Constitutional Tribunal, which is a sole guardian of the Constitution. 
Therefore, the temptation to blame the Law and Justice party for its willingness to 
subordinate the Constitutional Tribunal, which if politicized, loses its position as an 
ultimate forum limiting the power of the Government, is quite strong. On the one 
hand this is a legitimate claim, as the supremacy of the Constitution is a pivotal 
principle of the Polish political and legal system, unlike the UK, where Acts of 
Parliament are deemed supreme. 53  Besides the Presidential prerogative of the 
preventive control of constitutionality of a Bill envisaged by Art 122, the Polish 
Constitution foresees the second mechanism of controlling the constitutionality of 
an already passed Act, also known as subsequent control. The latter option appears 
as more democratic, as Art 56 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act empowers a wide 
range of parties, including individuals, to institute proceedings before it, if they 
express doubts as to constitutionality of an act in force.54 The ability to do so, 
significantly augments indirect multilateral control over the constitutional values 
and prevents the realization of antidemocratic and illegal practice and policies by 
the ruling party. On the other hand, a bill can only be declared unconstitutional and 
as a result null and void by the Tribunal, whose judges, ironically, according to Art 
194 of the Constitution, are elected by the Sejm. Such a situation leads to a 
                                           
51 Art 122.5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. 
52  The majority of constitutionalists agree that Art 132 of the Polish Constitution prohibiting the 
President to hold other offices or to discharge any other public functions should be read as renunciation 
of political party card. Formal separation from the party does not usually go hand in hand with practical 
collaboration. 
53  Mark Elliott, “Bicameralism, sovereignty, and the unwritten Constitution,” International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 5 (2007): 370; Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law (Oxon: Routledge, 
2013), 109-136. 
54 Cf. Article 79 and 191 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. 
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blurring of powers, where the Constitution, if not capable of being changed, is 
susceptible to manipulation by the legislature, executive, and the judiciary. The 
current rotational system based on a judge’s nine year term of office is imperfect, 
bearing in mind the fact that the last government lasted eight years. That being 
said, it means that a party, being capable of maintaining power for nine years, can 
thoroughly dominate the Constitutional Tribunal. 
The law-making, and in broader sense the ruling capacities of the Law and 
Justice party that it owes exclusively to the construction of the Polish political 
system, cannot therefore be equated with an accusation of violation of law. As 
much as its ability to enact law in an accelerated procedure should be respected, its 
standpoint towards the Constitution Tribunal should be regarded alike. The 
Constitutional Tribunal in Poland is a political court, and will remain as such as long 
as its judges are elected by the Sejm. As much as it may facilitate the governing of 
a party that stays long in power, it also can hamper the work of the newly elected 
party having its judges elected by the previous political regime. 
The second argument, put forward at the beginning of this section, was that 
the Law and Justice Party has been denounced due to its conservative beliefs and 
the measures it has implemented with regard to the opposition party (Civic 
Platform, PO). It is suggested that the domestic strikes were primarily organized by 
those who lost their jobs following the change in power,55 already referred to in the 
earlier section.56 Furthermore, it is maintained that “worsening image European 
actions” were indeed instigated by the members of the Civic Platform present in 
international organizations, including its former leader Donald Tusk as a President 
of the European Council.57 These actions might have been facilitated owing to the 
fact that the Law and Justice party enjoys a particularly unfavourable reputation in 
Europe, emanating from its short period in office, between 2006-2007, at which 
time it implemented Eurosceptic policies and procrastinated on the ratification of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Currently the party opposes the EU compulsory refugee quota. 
In such circumstances it is problematic to arrive at an objective and impartial 
conclusion on the matter, as the case is somehow more reminiscent of a wide-scale 
political rivalry than of a pure legal dispute.58 Clearly, politics and law are closely 
entangled in this instance, which is also evident in the Venice Commission Opinion, 
which, while proposing a solution to the crisis, noted: “As a political actor, the Sejm 
                                           
55 Beata Mazurek, “KOD to Komitet Obrony Demagogii,” wiadomosci.wp.pl (March 12, 2016) // 
http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1329,title,Beata-Mazurek-KOD-to-Komitet-Obrony-
Demagogii,wid,18210107,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=116a9b. 
56 See the Section 2.2. Media, Civil Service, the Police and Prosecution Laws. 
57  “Spirala histerii się nakręca: Schetyna i Petru jadą do Brukseli skarżyć się na polski rząd!?” 
wpolityce.pl (December 7, 2015) // http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/274247-tylko-u-nas-spirala-histerii-sie-
nakreca-schetyna-i-petru-jada-do-brukseli-skarzyc-sie-na-polski-rzad-zanosi-sie-tez-na-debate-w-pe. 
58 Arkadiusz Radwan, supra note 23: 5-6, 14-15. 
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is also best placed to establish a dialogue conducive to a political solution”.59 “The 
Venice Commission calls both on majority and opposition to do their utmost to find 
a solution in this situation”.60 
CONCLUSION 
The Polish ‘rule of law and democracy crisis’ has occupied a great deal of 
national and international attention, in which a lay observer who is unfamiliar with 
the reality of the Polish situation may easily be confused. First of all, a 
differentiation between who rules and how he rules should be made. In view of the 
current situation of the Law and Justice Party these two words tends to be confused 
for political reasons. Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that the rule of the PiS 
party takes place within the limits of the law and results from the nature of the 
Polish political system, which benefits the party that gains the most votes in the 
elections (including the ability to change the Constitution). The ability to amend and 
pass laws by an accelerated procedure is legitimate, given that PiS dominates all 
the institutions responsible for the legislative process (the Sejm, the Senate, the 
Government and the office of President). Such laws enjoy a presumption of 
constitutionality until proven otherwise by the Constitutional Tribunal or negatively 
assessed by the international court. The issue of the appointment of Constitutional 
Tribunal judges was a consequence of mistakes by the Civic Platform Party, 
including its willingness to elect two judges that should have been elected during 
the term of the next Sejm. This was exacerbated by a lack of clarity in respect of 
the law in relation to the period during which the President has to take oath from 
the elected judges. This however does not address the ongoing issue of the 
implementation of the Constitutional Tribunal rulings K/34 of December 3 and K/35 
of December 9 as well as the publication of a recent ruling K47/15 of March 9. In 
fact, it is a European and international standard to implement the judgments of the 
Constitutional Tribunal/ Court, which is fundamental to judicial independence, the 
separation of powers and proper functioning of the rule of law. 61  Furthermore, 
“[e]veryone should be able to challenge governmental actions and decisions 
adverse to their rights or interests. Prohibitions of such challenges violate the rule 
                                           
59 Venice Commission Opinion CDL-AD (2016)001 Opinion, supra note 9, par. 123. 
60 Ibid., par. 136. 
61  “Another aspect of the necessary respect for the Constitutional Court is the execution of its 
judgments. Not only the rule of law but also the European Constitutional Heritage require the respect 
and effective implementation of decisions of constitutional courts ….” (Venice Commission Opinion CDL-
AD (2012)026-e on the compatibility with Constitutional principles and the Rule of Law of actions taken 
by the Government and the Parliament of Romania in respect of other State institutions adopted by the 
Venice Commission at its 93rd plenary session, Venice (March 14-15, 2012), par. 67). 
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of law”.62 Nonetheless, the specifics of the Polish political system do not let us draw 
such a conclusion. The highest public bodies are intrinsically linked with politics, 
including judiciary and, as a result of the recent changes, also prosecution.63 The 
system remains relatively stable in the short term; however, it fails to address 
potential threats to the rule of law in the longer term, as shown in the example of 
the nine-year tenure of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal. The current situation 
is unprecedented. Since 1989, every party has ruled as part of a coalition. We 
might wonder what would happen if a party gained two-thirds seats in the Sejm 
and was capable of changing the Constitution. The line between democracy and 
dictatorship seems to be very thin, especially when it comes to Central and Eastern 
European states’ democracies, which remain fragile and profoundly susceptible to 
subversion.64 Drawing a parallel between Poland and Orban’s Hungary has become 
a standard65, but it is certain that even the PiS leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, would 
not be content with the proliferation of Martin Schultz’s label of the “Putninization of 
Polish democracy”. 
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